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01 JFDI – JUDGMENTS FROM DATA INSIGHTS
BY DAVID CASTLE 
Efficiency in bank risk management is essentially getting on top of data analytics. David Castle presents 
leading-edge thinking on the sorts of issues that banks should be addressing in this space. 
02 ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES & BTRM – NEW STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
03 BASEL III FINAL CHAPTER REFORMS
BY CHRIS WESTCOTT 
At long last the Basel Committee has articulated the requirements of the so-called “Basel IV” rules (in reality the 
final form of Basel III – “Basel IV” is a misnomer). These address important areas such as the Risk Weighted 
Asset output floor and the dropping of the advanced measurement approach for calculating operational risk 
regulatory capital. Chris Westcott takes us on an accessible and succinct journey down the road of Basel III’s 
“final chapter.” 
04 IRRBB: SENDING THE WRONG SIGNALS?
BY ZIAUDDIN ISHAQ AND ELISABETH LAURE 
Ziauddin Ishaq and Elisabeth Laure discuss whether the Enhanced Pillar II Approach of the IRRBB regulations 
may result in banks sending conflicting signals to external stakeholders and if the industry could potentially 
underestimate the challenges in meeting each of the detailed principles. 
05 THE GREAT BOND MARKET LIQUIDITY DEBATE: WHERE DO WE STAND NOW?
BY PETER EISENHARDT 
Peter Eisenhardt discusses the all-important topic of bond secondary market liquidity and the implications of 
lower levels of access for investors. 
06 CREDIT RISK AND ALM
BY DR. EDWARD BACE 
It seems fitting that in Issue 1 of a magazine titled ALCO, we present an article on the Asset and Liability 
Committee (ALCO) itself, and specifically on ALCO and credit risk. As finance students know the world over, the 
biggest driver of bank regulatory capital requirements is credit risk. For the ALCO to do its job properly, it has to 
have an element of ownership and oversight in this area, and Dr. Bace provides an eloquent rationale for why 
the ALCO should have this authority. 
07 FORMULATING ASSET ENCUMBRANCE RISK TOLERANCE: REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND BEST PRACTICES
BY ENRIQUE BENITO 
In a field of arcane and often opaque risk metrics, asset encumbrance and its management are perhaps the 
most arcane and opaque. We are pleased to have the market’s leading authority on this subject, Enrique Benito, 
share with ALCO readers the main pointers on how best to measure and monitor asset encumbrance levels. He 
also presents best-practice principles for asset encumbrance policy. 
08 STEERING BASEL III’S LIQUIDITY RATIOS
BY CHRISTIAN BUSCHMANN AND CHRISTIAN SCHMALTZ 
In every issue of ALCO, we will be presenting one in-depth technical article, the aim of which is to generate 
debate as well as to inform. For Issue 1, we consider the issue of compliance with Basel III liquidity standards 
(those bywords for assumptions-based risk estimation, LCR, and NSFR), and their impact on the balance sheet. 
For many banks this is materially significant, as entire business lines may have to be re-designed or even 
divested as they become more expensive to run or, indeed, unviable. For insight into steering one’s way around 
the LCR and NSFR maze, Christian Buschmann’s and Christian Schmaltz’s article on the challenges posed by 
Basel III liquidity compliance is top notch. 
09 THE BACK PAGE
BY PROFESSOR MOORAD CHOUDHRY
PAGE
05
12
14
17
24
27
32
36
54
TABLE OF CONTENTS










2726
Peter Eisenhardt is Secretary General of the 
International Council of Securities Associations. He has 
worked in treasury, money market trading, bond options 
trading, repo, credit, and debt origination in New York, 
London, and Tokyo over a 30-year career at Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch and J.P. Morgan.
market participants assumed there would always 
be a price so they could take on what turned out 
to be excessive risk. Liquidity disappeared when 
it was needed most, and its fragility should never 
be forgotten. The dealer community is focusing 
attention on newer initiatives that could make it 
even more difficult for market-making and 
liquidity, including the Fundamental Review of the 
Trading Book (FRTB), EU Bank Structural 
Reforms, and Financial Transaction Taxes.
So where are we now on this debate? Regulators 
acknowledge that we are in a “brave new world” 
that is working well enough for now. But, the 
cumulative effects of the mass of new regulation 
are not yet fully known, especially as full 
implementation is not yet complete. The new 
market structure has never been tested in a 
crisis.  
Well-functioning secondary markets are key to 
the continued robust primary market upon which 
the global economy has come to depend, as 
investors will not buy new bonds if they are 
having difficulties with the ones the already own. 
Super low rates, QE, and a benign credit cycle 
have made for near perfect bond markets 
conditions where investors compete for supply. 
Even the most lowly rate sovereign credits are 
able to issue on attractive terms, with one 
recently defaulted country launching a successful 
100-year bond. What happens when these
conditions change? At least there is always some
natural and largely captive demand from central
banks and banks, collateral providers, and
insurance companies and pension funds that
match longer-term liabilities with assets.
Central banks have learned more about 
intervening in bond markets through QE, in 
addition to their historic focus on stabilizing 
banks. For now, authorities are focused on 
collecting and analyzing more high quality and 
uniform data. The need for a better understanding 
of linkages and likely behaviors in disrupted 
markets is fully appreciated. 
CREDIT RISK AND ALM
BY DR. EDWARD BACE, DEPUTY HEAD OF FACULTY, BTRM
What does credit risk have to do with asset and 
liability management (ALM)? Plenty! The risks 
faced by financial institutions are diverse, but 
interconnected. Financial institutions attempt to 
manage risk, among other ways, through product 
features, such as variable interest rate products, 
to mitigate the interest rate risk arising from 
changes in interest rates.
These efforts can, of course, affect future levels 
of credit risk. As rates rise, borrowers have to pay 
higher interest, and this heightens the risk that 
borrowers will be unable to make those higher 
payments, which naturally raises concerns among 
financial institutions about credit risk.
Effective credit risk management, therefore, 
needs to incorporate a framework integrated with 
the overall ALM process. This is critical for 
financial institutions as they trade off interest rate 
risk for credit risk. This is where the Asset and 
Liability Committee (ALCO) plays a key role.
In the first instance, an effective credit risk 
management system should have three main 
elements:
• Risk scoring or loan grading
• Stress testing and
• Loan loss reserving
These elements must be embedded in the 
financial institution’s credit and lending policies. 
These policies form part of a living document that 
changes and adapts as new regulations are 
introduced and as the institution’s business 
strategy develops.
Risk Scoring
Following are key principles of an effective credit 
policy:
• Risk scoring models should be designed
so that consistent measurements can be
applied to similar types of loans.
• A good risk scoring model should include
both objective and subjective factors that
give an accurate reflection of a
borrower’s ability to repay debt.
• If a model is too objective, it can create a
“black box” that lenders will try to
circumvent.
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• If a model is too subjective, lack of 
consistency results, which can create 
additional risk in the loan portfolio.
The key is finding the right balance between 
regulatory scrutiny and adequate flexibility for 
lenders to pursue transactions acceptable to the 
financial institution’s risk profile.
Stress Testing
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the largest financial 
institutions to carry out stress tests, and 
guidance has been given on stress testing for 
community banks with assets over US$10 billion. 
This guidance suggests that institutions should 
calculate and document their relevant loss rates 
for two-year stressed scenarios according to a 
base line, adverse circumstances, and severely 
adverse circumstances.
Naturally, these losses are carried forward to the 
income statement and the balance sheet, where 
the capital ratios are ultimately assessed. A 
robust stress testing process will leverage the 
risk-scoring models to assess the actual impact 
of each of the stress scenarios carried out.
The institution’s ALCO has to be made aware of 
these results, as the bank may be required to 
raise additional capital and funding.
Credit Risk Assessments and Mitigants
Many banks have developed their own internal 
rating models to form their own view of 
customer creditworthiness. These internal 
models also help banks reflect on why rating 
agencies may not agree with each other.
Internal rating models have also enabled banks to 
obtain capital treatment advantages, balanced by 
the significant costs to developing and sustaining 
these models.
Setting Credit Limits
Best practice dictates establishment of a credit 
risk appetite for each counterparty, industry, and 
group to which there is actual or potential 
exposure. Limits should also be set to cover the 
overall exposure to the highest risks (as these are 
the most likely to default and, hence, to create 
losses for the bank).
ALCO should be aware of the approaches utilized 
in considering issues related to the availability of 
liquidity and capital. A bank should organize its 
ALCO and Executive Committee structure in a 
way that ensures that ALCO has ultimate 
authority over credit risk policy.
A sensible approach is to ensure that the credit 
risk appetite for better quality clients is higher 
than for the weaker clients. However, one must 
consider “what-if” scenarios, allowing the 
re-setting of lower limits in anticipation of credit 
deterioration.
Other mitigants include use of credit derivatives, 
and possibly structured financings. 
Credit Products
It is very important to understand the borrower’s 
business and its funding base. It is equally 
important to ensure that borrowers are well 
positioned to meet their objectives.
A lender should feel confident that the borrower 
is trying to neutralize the effect of market risk 
movements (including changes in interest rates 
and exchange rates), and that they borrow in 
currencies that match their assets and liabilities 
appropriately. Just as ALCO reviews the bank’s 
ALM to measure the potential effect of rate 
changes, so should the borrower regularly 
undertake a similar review. Borrowers or 
counterparties who run significant mismatches 
must be treated with caution, as handsome 
profits today could easily turn into large losses 
tomorrow. 
ALCO, moreover, should consider carefully how 
best to raise funds for the bank. Debt investors 
have different objectives, and some are seeking 
higher (gross) returns than others.
Debt Structure
In this respect, it is important to be able to offer 
investors different types of debt instruments.
Subordinated debt, for instance, not only offers 
higher returns than other forms of debt, but also 
provides an extra layer of protection for 
unsecured creditors, in addition to shareholders’ 
equity. Unsecured creditors will be very focused 
on how much asset value could be lost before 
their own debt is at risk.
The relative rates of return for different levels of 
seniority will vary according to the strength of the 
counterparty, reflecting the risk of loss. A senior 
secured creditor will be in the safest position, 
albeit at a low return, while an ordinary 
shareholder is in the riskiest position, and 
expects a much higher return.  
Banking versus Trading Book
As we know, the banking book positions 
generally reflect assets intended to be held until 
maturity (e.g., bank loans). The trading book 
positions tend to reflect instruments held for a 
short period of time and then sold (e.g., a 
portfolio of bonds and shares). Credit risk 
obviously has to be considered for both, but even 
more so for banking book positions.
Deterioration in the creditworthiness of 
borrowers within the trading book could result in 
difficulties in selling the asset later. Therefore, 
when acquiring an asset and reviewing it on an 
ongoing basis, it remains critically important to be 
aware of issues that may affect a borrower’s 
creditworthiness.
Pricing Credit Risk
In simplistic terms, credit pricing is driven by 
default probability, exposure, loss given default, 
and the cost of the capital a lender is required to 
hold to support its lending activities. All these 
have to be covered to allow a bank to break even. 
Credit risk costs are, therefore, higher for higher-
risk clients and/or for longer-term lending.
In this context the evaluation and monitoring 
process is fundamental. Anomalies should be 
fully communicated, also to ALCO, so that 
everyone is aware, particularly if default is a 
possibility.
Loan Loss Reserves (Provisioning)
Eventually one has to decide whether a loan loss 
provision needs to be raised to cover an expected 
shortfall.
Trading book assets are valued daily according to 
market price, which ought to include any inherent 
expectation about credit risk and ultimate 
shortfall (so an additional provision is, perhaps, 
not necessary). Clearly however, if the bank held 
a significant proportion of the debt issue and did 
not believe the holding could be sold at the 
stated market price, then an adjustment would 
be necessary.
For banking book assets, clear concerns should 
be manifested before taking action. Initially, when 
concern arises, interest income should no longer 
be accrued to profits on a daily basis; it should be 
suspended and only credited to profits on receipt 
of payment. This ensures that the principal loan 
amount does not increase with capitalized 
interest.
When concerns are heightened that the principal 
may not be repaid, the likely shortfall should be 
assessed and a provision raised.
In assessing the level of provision required, the 
likelihood of default should be considered, and if 
this should occur, the level of shortfall that could 
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be expected. Predictions, alas, are always fraught 
with uncertainty. It is certainly not an exact 
science, but auditors have to be satisfied that the 
view expressed is within the realm of reason. 
In addition to specific provisions (against 
identified problems), banks are also required to 
charge general provisions, which reflect problems 
at the balance sheet date which are yet to be 
recognized (there is always a lag period before 
information is known). 
One may take the view that the information base 
is typically two months out of date, and, 
therefore, two months’ worth of recent annual 
provision charges should be applied (if this is 
deemed to be a reasonable proxy).
Much debate has occurred in recent years over 
the provisioning approach, with many participants 
unhappy with the accounting treatment (believing 
that that it does not provide an accurate view of 
asset quality).
A new bank, which is adding new high-risk loans 
and charging high rates of interest, will not detect 
problems with the loan book at an early stage, 
and profits will appear impressive. However, 
problems will inevitably emerge in later years, 
when the “expected losses” begin flowing 
through.
New rules under IFRS 9 recognize that a loan is 
acquired at the outset with a loss expectation. 
Therefore, going forward, through analyzing cash 
flows over the life of a financial obligation and 
applying a default-probability factor, an 
appropriate discounted value can be obtained.
ALCO and Credit Risk
Our recommended operating model is that ALCO 
have effective authority to monitor, and ultimately 
approve, all operational aspects that impact the 
balance sheet. By definition, therefore, that 
would include credit risk, as that is the biggest 
driver of most banks’ regulatory capital 
requirement. The best-practice infrastructure is 
shown in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 2 shows the interplay 
of risks across the balance sheet. 
Given the importance to the balance sheet, ALCO can only pursue its mission effectively if it has final 
authority on credit risk exposure and adherence to credit risk appetite. This means the overall policy of 
the Credit Risk Committee must be subject to ALCO review. Such an operating model is not unknown, 
but it is not common. The rationale is clear enough, however:  ALCO has responsibility for through-the-
cycle sustainability of the balance sheet. Credit risk exposure is the main negative impact potential on the 
balance sheet; therefore, ALCO must have oversight of it. This does not mean day-to-day running and 
minutiae of credit origination. It means approval of policies, monitoring of exposure and, approval 
authority on significant transactions and any changes to policy.
Of course, ultimately, the best credit risk mitigation is sound origination policy.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to reinforce the vital role of the ALCO in credit risk, as part of the wider 
balance sheet risk operating model. In order to be able to fulfill the mission effectively, the recommended 
approach is to operate a technical and pricing sub-committee structure reporting to ALCO.
This helps to ensure that ALCO has oversight of the credit risk policy in the bank, given that credit risk is 
the main risk exposure on the balance sheet, and that ALCO has primary and paramount responsibility for 
the balance sheet.
Exhibit 1: Best Practice Board and Executive Committee Structure
Board
Executive 
Committee
ALCO
Balance Sheet 
Management 
Committee
Credit Risk 
Committee
Deposit Pricing 
Committee
Product Pricing 
Committee
Exhibit 2: ALCO and Risk Committee Interaction
Investment Bank Corporate Bank Private Bank
Risk Management
Risk Origination
Senior Management Board
Risk culture
Return targets and guidelines
ALM Committee
Capital, liquidity, interest-rate and FX risk
Risk Management Committee
Bank-wide monitoring and compliance with limits
Credit Risk Market Risk Interest-Rate Risk Operational Risk
Source: Choudhry (2012) The Principles of Banking. Reproduced with permission.
Source: Choudhry (2012) The Principles of Banking. Reproduced 
with permission.
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